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REPUTATION.
It is not the object of this paper to discuss the admissibleness of evidence, by the defendant in a criminal case, of his good
character [reputation] in order to render less easy the belief by
the jury of his guilt; nor by the prosecution of his bad character, in order to encounter that of good character given by the
defendant. Nor, does it concern itself with the character of a
party in a civil case; nor with that of a witness, whether in a civil
or in a criminal case.
SANITY IN

CRIMINAL CASES.

It is just as easy for a man to establish a reputation for
sanity or insanity as for veracity, or honesty, or peaceableness.
A reputation for veracity or honesty can spring only from words
and conduct, and from words and conduct can equally spring a
reputation for sanity or the want of it. However, in a murder
case, the court properly excluded a question put by the defendant's counsel, to a witness, with a view to showing the defendant's being non combos mentis, "What was and is now the
reputation of the defendant in the neighborhood in which he.was
born and raised and lived, as to his mental capacity."' In
another murder case, the trial court without error, refused to allow a question, whether the witness "ever heard as a common
rumor, among Hall's [the defendant's] former companions and
associates that he was subject to fits and other attacks."'
SANITY IN CIVIL CASES.

In an ejectment by A alleged to be a lunatic, for land which
she had conveyed to B, and the conveyance of which she was
'Pannell v. CoM. 5 W. N. 481; 86 Pa. z6o.
2Hall v. Com. 22 W. N. 25.
(103)
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seeking to avoid, Gibson, C. J., said vaguely, "The presumption
of the law is undoubtedly in favor of sanity in the first instance;
but it may be rebutted by an implication of insanity made by
friends and relatives (?) or by the common report of the neighborhood." 3 This opinion is however disparaged by Paxson J.,
in 1875. In an action by a bank against the maker of a promissory note which it had discounted, the question was allowed to
be put by defendant's counsel to a witness; "Wrhat was the
general report of the neighborhood as to the state of his mind?"
"whether for years back it had not been the current report in the
neighborhood, that Moore (defendant) was of unsound mind and
unfit to do business." A judgment for the defendant was reversed; Paxson, J., saying, "We are unable to see how the
neighborhood reports of Moore's insanity could possibly have
*
*
If offered to
been legitimate evidence in this case.
prove the distinct fact of Moore's insanity it was clearly inadmissible. It was at best mere hearsay, and no amount of such
evidence could legally establish such fact."'
PROSECUTION

FOR KEEPING BAWDY-HOUSE.

In prosecution for keeping a bawdy-house, that the house is
such may be proved by its reputation. The bad conduct occurring in such a house, and which makes it such a house, can usually only be proved directly by the testimony of the participants,
who cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves. Hence,
proof of the general reputation of the house should be allowed.'
In Com. v. Bunnel the question was properly permitted "What
was the general reputation of the Windsor Hotel (the alleged
bawdy-house) prior to Sept. 4th, 1901 for morality and chastity,
good or bad?" This evidence needs to be supplemented. "It
should never be regarded" said Wickham J., "as more than an
aid in ascertaining the character of the place." It is a circumstance to be weighed with others.7 The reputation of the female
frequenters and inmates of the house with respect to chastity
may be proved.'
3Rog~rs v. Walker, 6 Pa. 371
4

Lancaster County Nat. Bank v. Moore 78 Pa. 407.
Com. v. Murr, 7 Super. 391; Com. v.'Bunnell, go Super. 51; Com. v.
Salanich, 28 Super. 310; Com. v. Sarves, x7 Super. Ao. In Com. v. Eagler,
5

10

Kulp, 1o7; such evidence was thought incompetent by Halsey J.
S20
Super. 39!.
7

Tom. v. Murr, 7 Super. 391.
8
Com. v. Eagler, 1o Kulp, 107; Corn. v. Murr, 7 Super. 391; Com. v.
Salanich, 28 Super. 330.
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THE TIME OF BIRTH 01 A PERSON.

The time of birth of a person may become relevant both in
civil and in criminal cases; e. g. in indictments for seduction, or for
statutory rape; in actions on contracts, the defence of which is
the minority of the party when making a contract9 in applicatiofis
by a minor to be allowed to choose his own guardian, on the
ground that he is over fourteen years of age in suits by a parent
for damages, for marrying his minor child" in suits on a policy
of life insurance, the defence being a misrepresentation of the
age, that is of the time of birth, of the cestui que vie" in an
ejectment, the land having been devised to X with a proviso that
if he died before the full age of twenty-one years, it should go
over to a charity, it becoming necessary, X having died, to know
whether he was twenty-one years old or more."
HOW PROVE TIME OF BIRTH.

A person who was present at the birth of a child, e. g. the
mother herself, a physician, a nurse' may prove the time of the
birth. This kind of evidence becomes unattainable, the greater
the distance of litigation from the time or the place of the birth.
Those who have direct knowledge of the time of the birth of a
person when he is ten or twenty years old, are more numerous
than those who have it when he is fifty or sixty years old. If
the controversy is in a state or country different from that of his
birth, the difficulty of procuring witnesses who may prove the
age, is greater, than when it arises in the same state or country. In the absence of mother, nurse, physician, etc., the only
available evidence is something which is founded on the declaration of such mother, nurse, etc. If these are alive probably
their depositions must be taken if their personal presence cannot
be commanded by the tribunal." If the physician or nurse is
dead, probably no information emanating from him is admissible.
9

Watson v. Brewster, i Pa. 381; Curtis v. Patton, 6 S. & R. x35.
'0Benz's Estate, i W. N. 486.
"Carskadden v. Poorman..io W. 83.
'25American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507.
' Clarkev. Trinity Church, 5 W. & S. 266.
14Benz's Estate, i W. N. 486. For some reason the affidavit of the
nurse was received by the court, which allowed itself to be convinced that
the child was 14 years old, and therefore entitled to choose his own guardian.
"See Benz's Estate, however, for use of an affidavit.
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If the mother is dead, her declaration may be proved by a sister"8
or brother' of the party whose age- is in question; or probably
by any one who has heard and who remembers them. That
declarations of the deceased mother are receivable, "has always
been held" says Rogers, J., "for otherwise a person could not
prove his own age; for where no family record is made, he can
only show it from the declaration of his parents or others
cognizant of the fact. Such testimony has always been received
unless there was better evidence in the power of the party."
FAMILY BIBLE.

It is said that if there is a record in a family bible, which is
admissible and available, the declarations of the deceased parent
as to the time of birth or age of the child will not be receivable as
the sole evidence of the fact. 8 Such record in the family bible
is not receivable, when it appearing to have been made by a
person not having the family name it does not appear whether he
was a stranger or relative of the family, nor whether he had
authority to make the entry. 9 Such at least is the assumption
of Rogers, J. But if a book is proved to be a family bible, is
kept in the family, is accessible to the parents of the family,
surely they may be presumed to authenticate it by thus recognizing it. It is absurd, on the discovery that the hand-writing
is not that of any member of the family, to insist on specific proof
that he had authority to make the entry, and was correctly informed of the fact which he recorded. A record in a family
bible, is receivable, to prove the time of birth of a son, A, when
B, another son, testifies that he copied the entries at the direction of his father, from another book, in which the father had
originally made entries of the births of his chldren, if it is proved
16Watson v. Brewster, i Pa. 381.
"7In West v. Sherer, i Lack, Jur. 117, it was said by Archbald J. that a
witness' testimony as to whether a mother of X told him as to the time of

birth of X was not admissable. Apparently the mother was dead. The
report leaves uncertain whether it was the witness' mother or X's,
whose declaration was testified to. In Albertson v. Robeson, 1 Dall. 9, a

brother of plaintiff, sixty years old, was not permitted to prove the plaintiff's age by declarations of the father and mother.
' 8Watson v. Brewster, i Pa. 381.
19Watson v. Brewster, x Pa. 38t. The declarations of a member of
the family who is still alive as to the age of another member of the family,
cannot be proved. The declarant herself must be sworn and examined;
Howard v. Musser, i Lanc. Bar, 1870.
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that this original book has been lost or destroyed. _In the absence of proof of such loss or destruction, the original, presumed
to be still in existence will be the best evidence, and the copy
If it appears that the leaf of the bible
will be inadmissible.'
containing the entries of births of children was torn out and
sent on to Washington, to be used in procuring a pension for the
mother then a widow, and it does not appear whether the leaf is
in existence or not, but it is probably lost or destroyed, secondary
evidence of the time of birth of a daughter, viz., the declarations
of the mother (now dead) will be receivable.21
PROOF OF TUR

ENTRIES.

The person who made the entries, though he is the father of
the person whose age is in question, and though h.e. is the plaintiff
in the- action, may, instead of testifying directly to the age,
authenticate the entries, and qualify them to be received. In a
suit against a, justice of the peace for marrying a minor son, the
plaintiff produced a book, which he said, was his family bible;
and pointing to a record in it, said that it was written by himself and was the record of the births of his children; and that the
record of Henry's birth [Henry was the minor whom the defendant had married] was truly made a day or two after the
birth. It was held that the entries of this class are receivable,
when duly proved, and that on the ground of necessity even the
plaintiff could prove them.2
PROOF OF AGE BY RECORD.

It may be, the habit of certain persons to keep records of
certain classes of facts. Their character and the objects for which
the records are kept, may furnish a certain guaranty that the
records made correspond with their present beliefs as to the fact
which they are recording, and that they have made competent
investigation in order to inform themselves. Their consciences,
the law of the organization to which they are officers, the civil
law even, may require the keeping of the record, and that effort
.shall be made to learn the facts which it reports. The record
then becomes a.report of what is told the recording officers, if
the fact is one which he has not directly observed. The parish
priest is not present at the birth of a child, but its birth and the
2OCurtis
v. Patton, 6 S. & R.
2

235.

'Watson v. Brewster, iPa. 381.

2Carskaddon

v. Poorman, jo W. 82.
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time of its occurrence may be reported to him, when -he baptizes
it. He records the baptism. Of that be has direct knowledge.
But the name of the subject is told him, as is the time of its birth.
From the appearance of the child he may possibly know within
a few days or weeks, whatits age is, but, if the child is advanced
somewhat, the inference of its age would lose certainty. A
record of age of the baptized therefore, embodies the report made
by others. This report may be made by the parent who knows,
or by some one else. The record may not show the method
taken by the officer, to inform himself, and be may have" been
more -r less influenced by the assertions of indeterminate persons, that is, by reputation. The parish priest in Baden may
testify in 1868, that prior to 1810, a law of the Duchy required
the priest to keep a-record of baptisms, and the record purporting to have been made Oct. 17th, 1798 may describe the baptism of an infant, born on the same day, about the fifth morning hour, of Joseph Hermnin and Elizabeth, lawful consorts of
the parish, to which child was given the name Maria Cathrina.
This record may be used as evidence of the time of the birth of
Maria Catharina Kring, who died at Scranton, evidence being
given tending to show the identity of the child and of Mrs.
Kring."
LINEAL RELATIONSHIP

An act of assembly declaring that X is the child of A, and
shall have all the rights and privileges of a child born in lawful
wedlock e. g. describing X as "the daughter of Thomas McKee
and Jeanette Andrews" isf5'mafacie evidence of the daughtership. " It may rest on the assertion of Jeanette Andrews, or of
Thomas McKee. Thomas McKee's opinion may rest in part on
the declarations of Miss Andrews. The legislature simply declares to be a fact, what some one else has said to its committee.
Explicit declarations by a man, that a certain person is his son
or daughter25 or recognition and demeanor, indicating that he
23

American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507,

In Clark v. Trinit3

Church, 5 W. & S. 266, a church record was said to exist for the purpose of
recording baptisms, and that mention of the time of birth of the child baptized was only for description, and was not evidence of the time of birth.
24
McGunnigle
25

v. McKee, 77 Pa. 8.

Kenyon v. Ashbridge, 35 Pa. 157. Although declarations by A that B is
his son would prove the sonship, the making of these declarations, if those
who testify are within the jurisdiction of the court must be in court or by
deposition; not by ex-kiarte affidavit; Keller v. Metz, 5 S. & R. 246.
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considered that person as son or daughter. are evidence of the
fact of procreation and also of legitimacy, i. e. of the marriage of
the mother of this person. Entries by parents in family bibles,
would be declarative by them, of parenthood, and evidence of
filiation.' s
LINEAL REILATIONSHIP.

THE BIBLE.

In order to prove in an ejectment that B is the son of A, the
leaf of a bible of A, in which he has recorded the birth of B,
would be evidence. The leaf was produced to the jury. It was
proved to be a leaf from A's bible by the affidavit of some of A's
heirs (either B or the children of B under whom the plaintiff in
the ejectment claimed) taken before the chief-burgess (who was
also notary public) of the borough of Wilmington, Del. The
burgess testified under his notarial seal that the leaf was taken
from the book in his presence. The evidence was receivable,
despite the objection that the affiants were bolstering up the title
which they had conveyed; and that their evidence should have
been taken under a commission, and not in the form of an ex
Parne affidavit. The court justified receiving the evidence by
speaking of the "special circumstances of the case." It was
probable the children of A only could prove that the book was
his. They were not interested, having given no covenant of
warranty. Many religious persuasions keep no registers of births.
deaths and marriages.'
LEGITIMACY.

The legitimacy of a child may depend in part upon the marriage at the time of its begetting, or birth, of the father to the
mother. The birth of a child prior to the marriage. X having
died, his widow was entitled to the whole of his personal estate
if he was illegitimate and therefore had no collateral kin. If he
was legitimate, half brothers, the children of his mother, by a
subsequent marriage were entitled to a share. X had been.born
in Germany in 1809. His mother was subsequently married in
the United States to Goerman, in 1821. Children of this marriage claimed as half brothers. ihe court received the testimony
of witnesses, (a) of declarations by X's mother, after her marriage with Goerman, that X was illegitimate; (b) of declarations
'"Keller v. Nutz, 5 S. & R. 246 "Reputation hearsay," monumental inscriptions, are vaguely mentioned as evidence of pedigree.
2'

Douglass v. Sanderson, i Y. t5.
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by X himself, to the same import; (c) of declarations of friends
and acquaintances of the Goermans.'
The recognition by a
man, of children of a certain woman as his own, e. g. memoranda
written by himself of expenses incurred in their behalf, in which
they bear his name, their enrollment in schools, as his children
(i. e. children of Joseph M. Drinkhouse) his showing solicitude
when they are sick, etc., is evidence not merely of his paternity
but of the marriage of himself with their mother, i. e. of their
legitimacy.'
When A always speaks of B as his son, introduces
him to the world as such; when B bears A's name, he will be
presumed legitimate."
LEGITIMACY PROVED BY DECLARATIONS OF OTHER THAN
PARENTS.

The parents have primary knowledge of the legitimacy of
their offspring. A and B may be children of thp same mother, B's.
father being X, prior to whose marriag'e with his mother, A was
born. Had B's mother been previously married, and was A the
child of this previous marriage, or was he illegitimate? B being
dead, his declarations or recognitions of A as a half brother, are
evidence of that fact, and of his legitimacy, so as to entitle A's
children to share in Bs' estate. It is not necessary in proving
the declarations or recognitions, to prove on whose information
they were founded."1 Declarations of A, now dead, and of the
common mother of A and B, are also receivable.
MARRIAGE.

That A and B are husband and wife, may be proved, of
course by those who were present at the making of the contract,
called and sworn as witnesses. It may be proved by the declarations of A or of B. Such declarations are said to be direct
proof. "2 It is said that they are against interest, but whether
they are against interest or not, may depend on circumstances.
The declaration by a woman that she is the wife of a wealthy
man, may not seem to her to be, nor in fact be, against her interest. Recognitions by A, of B, as his wife, allowing her to
2
8Goerman's Appeal, i Sadler, 88. The decision was that X was illegitimate.
29Drinkhouse's
Estate 151 Pa. 294. A's recognition of C as his daughter,
his supporting her etc. were evidence of C's being A's next of kin. and heir,
after A's death.

Kenyon v. Asbbridge, 35 Pa. 157.

3"Adose v. Fosit, Pears.
P
3o4; Wolf
3'Pickens' Estate, 163 Pa. 14.

v.

Borngresser, 8 Dist. 411.
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bear his name, introducing her to his family and friends as his
wife, etc., are evidence of the marriage. Cohabitation with the
reputation of being man and wife, is evidence that the parties
are such,' but reputation, not coupled with cohabitation, is not
sufficient to prove a marriage.' Admission of A that B is his
wife, with cohabitation and reputation are sufficient.'
Cohabitation alone, without the reputation of being husband and wife,
is not sufficient.'
The reputation may be divided. Some may
think and say that the parties are, and others that they are not
married. Of such a situation the trial court said, "a divided
reputation, and cohabitation do not, by themselves, constitute
presumptive evidence of the fact of marriage."
But, even a
divided reputation may be considered in conjunction with cohabitation, and direct or other indirect proof of the marriage, as evidence of it."7 The reputation of marriage may be in the family
of the man or the woman, whose marriage is in question; but it
may also, and usually is, the reputation among the friends and
acquaintances of the parties. But, when the marriage has been
proved by the wife by a marriage certificate of the justice of the
peace who performed the ceremony, and the proof that the deceased husband exhibited the certificate to his brother as evipence that he had been married, and not by reputation, the marriage cannot be disproved by evidence that the woman had always been known in the neighborhood, by the name of Mrs.
Woodcock, and not by that of Mrs. Hill, Hill being the name of
the alleged husband."3
VAMILY OPINION.

The opinion entertained by members of A's orof B's family,
as to their being married to each other, is receivable as evidence,
"2Greenawalt v. McEnelley,85 Pa. 352. But declarations by a man that
he is not married to X are not receivable to disprove the marriage; Hill v.
Hill, 32 Pa. 511.
33Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Hall, 6i Pa. 361. (Action by woman, as wife
of X for his killing); Thorndell v. Morrison, 25 Pa. 326; (Attempt of a
woman to avoid her deed, on the ground that, being married, her husband
had not united in its execution); Senser v. Bower, i P. & W. 450. Goerman's App..i Sadler 88; Covert v. Hertzog, 4 Pa. 145.
35Vincent's App. 6o Pa. 228.
'3 Com. v. Stump, 53 Pa. i34; Picken's Appeal, 153 Pa. I4; Richards v.
Brehm, 73 Pa. 140; Greenawalt v. McEnnelley, 85 Pa. 352.
37Greenawalt v. McEnnelley, 85 Pa. 352.
' 8Hill v. Hill, 32 Pa. 511.
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when the opinion manifests itself in various ways, e. g. by recognition by A's family of B, as his wife. It may be manifested
by assertions that B is A's wife. The assertions, if relied on to
prove the married relation, must be made before controversy has
arisen concerning the fact, and the declarant must be dead. But the
fulfilment of these conditions is not enough if the marriage to be
proved is recent, so that other evidence of it is presumably accessible. In an action of dower, a plea to which was we unques accou75le,
A was improperly allowed to testify to the declaration of his deceased father, an uncle of the plaintiff, respecting the fact of
marriage. 'Thcre had been given evidence of cohabitatiom
Says Gibson, C. J., "Such evidence [of declaration] is admis.
sible in questions of pedigree, depending on legitimacy, for it is
often necessary in them to mount up to a remote period for evidence of marriage and the traditions of the family or the declarations of deceased persons whose relation to the parties qualified
them to speak with certainty, are frequently the best evidence of
which the case is susceptible and admissible by a-species of necessity; not so, where one of the parties produces them as evidence of a comparatively recent marriage, which is susceptible of
the ordinary proof, as any other fact of the same date."9
COLLATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

It may become important to ascertain whether certain persons long dead, were collaterally related. In 1884, in an ejectment Baltzer Gehr claimed an undivided third of land because
his father, Joseph Geehr, who died in 1798 was, as he alleged,
brother of Balser Geehr, who died in 1801. Balser Geehr's
grand daughter had died seised, in 1877, and her next of kin
were two women, children of a brother of Balser's wife, and Baltzer, the plaintiff, if Baltzer's father Joseph was brother of Balser
Geehr, the last owner's grand father. It was held that a nephew
of the plaintiff could prove the declarations of another nephew,
now dead, as to the relationship; that'a son of the plaintiff, could
prove'declarations of plaintiff's mother, now dead, as to the relationship; that plaintiff could himself testify that his father was
brother to Balser Geehr; and state that he learned this from his
mother; and that a daughter and a niece could testify to the
same matter. Statements thus provable, said Paxson J. must be
•Covert v. Hertzog, 4 Pa. 145. He alludes to the fact that evidence of
marriage had been produced.
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made ante litem motam; the declarant must be dead at the trial,
and the declaratit must be proved, otherwise than by his declaration, to be related to the family. This proved relationship
need be only of relationship to one of the branches, the relationship between which is in question. The relationship may be by
marriage. Thus, the wife of Joseph Gehr (mother of the plaintiff) might declare that her husband was brother of Balser Geehr,
and, she being now dead, and the declaration having been made
ante litem motam, could be proved as evidence of the brothership of Joseph and Balser. Any one who heard the declaration,
could of course prove it," although in the case referred to, all
the witnesses were admittedly members of the plaintiff's family;
his daughter, or nephew or niece, children of persons admitted,
apparently, to be brothers of the plaintiff.4'
ASSERTIONS OF LINEAL DESCENT FROM OTHERS.

In 1795, it was held that a recital by a grantor in a deed, of
descent from X, was receivable as evidence of that fact, in an
ejectment against one who did not claim the right of X. An application for land had been entered by Charles Sparks, under
which a survey was made in 1767, and a resurvey in 1786. A
deed, made in 1786, from divers persons to A, recited that they
were the children ot Sparks. In an ejectment by the lessee of
A, it was said that "recitals in a conveyance are evidence of
pedigree, the rules in general being much relaxed in this particular."
In Scharff v. Keener,' Agnew, J,, intimates that the
deed in Paxton v. Price being but nine years old, its doctrine
may need qualification, that in regard to revent matters, where
the evidence of pedigree is easily attainable, cases may arise
4OIn Bender v. Pitzer, 27 Pa. 333 Knox J. says that in cases of pedigree
"it has been frequently ruled that the witnesses who are called to testify
should be related to the family by blood or marriage, or at least should have
some personal knowledge of the family." But surely witnesses to declarations of members of the family, do not need themselves, to be members of
the family.
4"Sitler v. Gehr, io5 Pa. 577: Gehi v. Fisher, 143 Pa. 312. So long as
one judgment in ejectment was not conclusive, a yerdict finding plaintiffs
relationship with the deceased, followed by a judgment, did not bar in a
second ejectment, the renewal of the controversy as to the relationship;

Gehr v. Miller, 20 W. N. 387.
, 2Paxton v. Price, x Y. 5oo; The doctrine is repeated in general terms;

"The recitals of, or in deeds, with respect to pedigree, are evidence."
Morris v. Vanderen, i Dall. 64.
1s64 Pa. 376.
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where recitals in so recent a deed would not be entitled to the
weight given them in that case. In Scharff v. Keener, John
Hopp, by will proved March 4th, 1799, devised land to his daughter, Dorothea Schneider, for life and then "'to the heirs of
Johannes Hopp Jr." In the trial in 1870 of an action of trespass upon this land the plaintiff offered a deed dated April 30,
1827 from Philip Hopp to Peter Scholl, "left to him (Hopp) by
his grandfather Johannes Hopp, *
*
now occupied by
widow Schneider." The deed recited that the will of Johannes
Hopp was proved March 4, 1799. The trial judge rejected the
deed, because there was no proof that the grantors were the
heirs of Johannes Hopp, Jr. Those claiming under the deed,
had taken possession of the land on the death of the lifetenant Mrs. Schneider which occurred about 1850, and had had
possession until the trespass complained of. The defendant
claimed under a warrant and survey of 1830, which covered the
land in dispute. The judgment for the defendant was reversed,
Agnew J.saying that the deed was evidence of its own genuineness (being more than thirty years old, etc.,) and the recital of
descent from Johannes Hopp, Jr. being in an ancient deed, was
evidence thereof. In Murphy vs. Lloyd" ejectment for six
eights of a lot in Philadelphia, the plaintiff gave in evidence the
list of original purchasers from Wm.Penn, showing that George
Green was one of those purchasers, and as such entitled to a
lot in Philadelphia. He then offered the exemplification of a
deed from Thomas Green dated 1774, containing recitals that he
was son of Edmund Green, who was oldest son of Benjamin
Green, who was oldest son of Green, of Farringdon in the
county of Berks, G. B., and that the said Green became
lawfully seised in fee of 2000 acres in Pennsylvania. The trial
was in 1838. The court rejecting the evidence at Nisi Prins nonsuited the plaintiff. Motion to take off the non-suit was refused
by the court in bank; because (a) there was no evidence that the
Green was the George Green, the first purchaser; (b) the
recital is not sufficient evidence of the relationship between
George Green (were it clear that -Green is George Green)
and Thomas, the grantor. Huston J. asks "Is there any case
that the declarations of a plaintfff in a cause are any evidence of
his own pedigree?" He refers to the circumstance that there is
no possession or claim by Thomas Green previous to his deed.
443 Wh. 538.
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Proof of pedigree must be by persons who can prove on oath, what
they haVe heard, orseen or read and not by the statement of the
Apparently
party himself, and Thomas Green is a plaintiff.
then the objection was that Green did not prove the declarations
of others, on which he relied for knowledge of his relationship.
He did not prove a family tradition. Although he was not a
competent witness, and hence could not himself testify, his declaration, in his own deed, for a part of the land, was not evidence.
RIMAfTIONSHIP.
ASSBRTION OF COLLT RAMAL

The relationship of descent from a common pair of parents,
or other ancestry, may be established by assertions of those who
claim it under certain conditiong. In 1830, A, B, etc., executed
a power of attorney authorizing X to dispose of certain land, in
which they described themselves as brothers and sisters of.Richard Freeman." A deed was made in 1831, from these persons, by
their attorney X which recited that the grantors were "heirs at
law of Richard Freeman. In an ejectment tried before 1867, it
was held that the recitals in the power of attorney and in the
deed, were evidence of relationship. The power of attorney was
more than thirty years old. Recitals in ancient deeds are evidence, as against one who is not claiming under the person with
whom the relationship (defendant did not claim under Richard
Freeman)" is asserted.
The mother having since the birth of a child,
begotten
by X married Y, the fact that the child is recognized by Y, as her
child" bearing the name of X, is brought up inhis own house and
treated as his own children, is mentioned by Fell, J., as a circumstance pointing to the child's legitimacy. It is assumed that
the declaration of members of the family, through which the legitimate half-brothership of another is to be established, must have
been made ante Itter mnotam." While the declarations of the
mother as to the legitimacy of the son, are not based on reputation, those of her children by a later marriage do, in a sense
represent a family reputation.
'SHow Green was a plaintiff do.es not appear. He is not named as
such.
"Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Pa. 132.
47
Picken's Est. 153 Pa. 14. "Pedigree and boundary" says Agnew 3.
vaguely "are the excepted cases wherein reputation and hearsay of deceascd
persons are received as evidence;" McCausland v. Fleming, 63 Pa. 36.
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In an ejectment, the defendant was held entitled to a share
'of the land if Benjamin C. Louden was a legitimate child, otherwise the plaintiffs were entitled to recover all. That Benjamin
was born after his father's death was not decisive of illegitimacy,
but his father dying in February 1816, his birth in 1818, his
mother not then being re-married, would establish his illegitimacy. Declarations of the half brothers of Benjamin, as to his
legitimacy were not admissible unless they were shown at the
trial to be dead. Testimony of a half brother born to a later
husband of the mother, that it was generally believed in his
mother's family, that Benjamin was not legitimate; that he has
heard different members of the family say that he was the son of
a man named Catlin, not his mother's husband; is not sufficient
evidence of illegitimacy. Mere belief, says Archbald J., is not
the equivalent of family repute. Family repute is that which is
accepted and recognized in the family generally. It may be
made up in many cases of facts and circumstances which cannot
be reproduced nor analyzed and it is to be received as true because those most interested in the question so treat it. This is
much more than mere belief which may be founded upon suspicion or merely reflect the gossip of the neighborhood. The
general belief therefore in the family that Benjamin was illegitimate is not competent to establish that fact."'
]XTRA-VAMILY RUPUTATION.

A family reputation that, e. g. X is an illegitimate son of Z
is apt to spread from the immediate family of Z, to collateral
branches, or to the neighbors of Z who are in no way related to
her. It has however been held by Brubaker, J., that the reputation beyond the family unaccompanied with other evidence, is
not receivable. In partition among the children and issue of
Henry Borngresser, some claimants were grandchildren, children of 'Mrs. Wolf. It was alleged that Mrs. Wolf was not the
child of Henry Borngresser, but born out of lawful wedlock,
that her father was Henry S. Shearer, or his son. To prove
this, evidence was offered of a common iumor in the parish in
Germany in which Mrs. Wolf was born. The evidence was held
irrelevant. Only declarations from surviving members of the
family as to the common repute of the family, were held admis' 8 West v. Sherer, x Lack Jur. I17.
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sible. The general repute in the family, proved by the testimony
of a surviving member of it, comes within the rule. But, it is
hard to see, why the family repute cannot be proved by
persons who are not members of it. If a family is composed of
ten persons, and X has repeatedly heard each of nine of them say
that John, one of the ten, is a bastard, he surely can testify to
that fact, and thus prove the family reputation. The judge
recognizes tacit recognition of relationship, disposition of property, as admissible, as evidence from which the opinion of the
family may be inferred. But non-members of the family can
surely prove this recognition, this disposition. 4
RECORDS BEARING ON LEGITIMACY.

In order to show that Anna Elizabeth was the child of
Johan Heinrich Borngresser, the certificate of the present pastor
of the parish of Hesse Darmstadt where the child was born, attested with the official seal of the parish* the contents of the°
records of marriages and births in the parish was referred to.t
It showed the marriage of Borngresser with Margarete Dorothea
Riehl, July 26th, 1840, and the birth Feb. 7, 1841, of Anna
Elizabeth Borngresser "as the first child, the first daughter of
this matriage."" 1 The court conceded that, in order to make the
register, or the certificates of the contents of the registry evidence, the registry must be one which the law [here of Hesse
Darmstadt] required to be kept, and that it be kept in the manner required by the law. In order to prove that John Adam
(Steiger) was illegitimate, a copy of the record of birth and baptism of the Evangelical church at Grumbach, Germany, was offered; "On the 16th day of April 1809, in the afternoon at three
o'clock, Maria Barbara Grentz, the unmarried daughter of Conrad Grentz, who is a day laborer at Stierbach, was born to her

"Wolf vs. Borngresser, 8 Dist. 41 .
WIts legitimacy is presumed, and the only evidence to impeach it was
not sufficient for that purpose, the evidence of the registry was referred to
as indicating what evidence would be available should an investigation into
the legitimacy be gone into.
5'Wolf v. Borngresser, 8 Dist. 411. A church record in Lancaster
county, of the deaths and births, contained the entry: "Died Sept. xoth
188o, Elizabeth Wolf, nee Borngresser, wife of John Philip Wolf, born
Feb. 7, 1841, in Hesse Dormstadt, buried in Zion's Cemetery, Sept. 3, 88o,
aged 39 years, 7 months and 3 days.' This, says the court, it may be conceded, was competent simply to show the death and burial.
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an illegitimate son. On the 17th day of the same month he
was baptized and named John Adam. Tho father of that child
was said to be John Adam Steiger, who was known to his congregation as the legitimate single son of John Adam Steiger who.
was a farmer at Hembach," etc. To this copy was a certificate,
signed by the pastor of the church at Grombach, and under the
seal of the parish, to the effect that it was a true copy of the
record of the births and christenings.52 The judge who was about
to appoint a guardian, was satisfied that he was of the age of
fourteen years, and therefore entitled to choose a guardian, by
a copy of the records of the church apparently in Philadelphia,
in which he was baptized, showing the date of his birth and
baptism.5" "Amongst a number of religious persuasions" says
the court "in this conutry we well know no registers are kept.
To prove births, deaths, or marriages, copies of registers have
been frequently admitted; these are usually kept by the parish
In an ejectment, apparently to connect the present
clerks.'"'
plaintiff by descent from a former owner, John Oxley, who removed to, the isle of Barbadoes' from Philadelphia, a copy of
the register of marriages, baptisms and burials of the parish of
St. Michaels, was offered and received. The only evidence that
it was a true copy, was a certificate by the rector of the parish;
and the affidavit of one S. Beresford, taken from J. A. Beckle
deputy-secretary of the island, and notary public. There was
proof that Beckle was in these offices. His .hand-writing and
that of the rector were also proved. Beckle's certificate was under his hand and notarial seal. There was no dispute as to the
admissibleness of the copy of the register, if duly proved. The
controversy was in respect to the mode of. proving -it. It was
held to be sufficiently proved, in deference to the case of Hyam
v. Edwards' the real motive for the decision in which, it is said,
52

Goerman's Ap. i Sadler, 88. Apparently no proof was given of the
law of the place, nor that the record was kept in conformity with it
0Benz's Estate; i W. N. 486. In Carskaddon v. Poorman, 10 W.-82,
Rogers, J., says that "entries in the register of burials" may be. used to
prove death. Without the use of records, it might be impossible to prove
the time of the birth or death of obscure individuals.
54
Douglass v. Sanderson, i Y. 15. It is also observed that inscriptions

on tomb-stones may be used to prove a death.

-5 DalI. 2. A copy of a register of births .and deaths of the Quakers
in England, proved to be a true copy before the Lord Mayor of London,
was admitted to Irove the death of a person. In Keller v. Nutz, 5 S. & R.
246 it is said that an ex parte affidavit will not be received to prove pedigree, the witness living within the reach of the subpoena of the court.
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was the difficulty and expense of procuring evidence from beIn Winder v. Winder," in an action of dower in
yond sea 2
order to prove that the plaintiff had been the wife of the decedent
a copy made by the vicar of the parish register, in England,
where the marriage occurred, asserting her marriage with Edmund Winder, on May 11th, 1727, at a place called Goosenargh,
Lancashire, was received. It was proved by a witness in court
to have been compared with the original. This and evidence of
the identity of the deceased with the Edmund Winder, was
called by the chief justice "positive proof of the intermarriage" with Edmund Winder. The age of a certain Maria
Katharina Kring being in question, an extract from the parish
records of births, baptisms, etc., at Odenheim, Baden, was offered. It stated that on Oct. 17, 1798, the pastor baptized an
infant, born on the same day, to which the name Maria Cathrina
was given. The deposition of the parson at Odenheim in 1874
was taken. He swore that prior to 1810, church records were
kept according to the law of the country; that he was the custodian of the records, and that among them was the record of
which he gave the extract. This evidence was receivable.'. In
Sitler v. Gehr6' the principle is laid down that while the record
marriages, deaths and burials of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, kept according to law, was evidence of these facts and
their dates, it was not evidence of additional matters, knowledge
of which the maker of the record could learn only by information: e. g. the names of the parents of the deceased, the place of
their birth, and the dates of the birth and death. The record of
such matters it was not the pastor's duty to make. "Such registers are not" says Paxson, J., "in general, evidence of any fact
not to be recorded in them, and which did not occur in the presence of the registering officer."
5Kingston v. Lesley, io S. & R. 383.
Reference is made to Fockler's lessee v. Simpson, as ruling
5 7 Y. 152.

the same point.
5

3American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507. Yet, see Clark v.

Trinity Church, 5 W, & S. 266, where a registry of baptism as occurring
Oct. 3d, xSxi which also mentioned the time of birth as Oct. ist, i8il was
held inadmissible to prove the time of birth, because it was evident that the
obf'ect of the register was to register the baptism, and the reference to the
birth was matter of description.
xo5 Pa. 577.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

MOOT COURT.
COMMONWEALTH vs. ADAMS.
Embezzlement, Receiving Embezzled Goods.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Thomas converted money to his own use under such circumstances as
to render him guilty of embezzlement by trustee under the 113th section of
the act of March 31st, 1860. Adams received the money frown Thomas. At
the time he received the money Adams knew exactly how Thomas had obtained it. Adams received it with the intention of keeping it.
JONEs, counsel for the ilaintiff.
SILVERMAN,

counsel for the defendant.

McW¥HINNEYJ.-From the facts given irthis case the defendant is
not indicted upon any specific charge. This we think involves the point in
question, Can Adams be held on any charge? Thomas was found guilty of
embezzlement by trustee under the 113th section of the act of March 31st,
1860 which reads as follows.
"If any person being a trustee of any property for the benefit either
wholly or partially, of some other person, or for any public or charitable
phrpose, shall, with intent to defraud, convert or appropriate the same, or
any part thereof, to or for his own use or purpose, or the use or benefit of
any other person, or shall with intent aforesaid, otherwise dispose of or destroy such property, or any part thereof, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Upon consulting the statutes upon this subject, especially the
statutes upon embezzlement and receiving stolen goods, this idea stood
prominently forth, that the legislators as far as they were able to foresee,
attempted to forestall any or all knavish practices in conflict with the
morals of a community or public policy. Now it is undeniably in direct conflict with the best interests of the public to let a man in the position of
Adams escape the penalty of the law.
Assuming for a moment that Adams is not guilty of any crime, what
are the logical consequences of such an assumption? They are such as to
render all property held by such a trustee as Thomas, liable to loss through
trickery and fraud. For although 13 the trustee is guilty of a misdemeanor,
he has already given the moneys, chattels, goods or whatever it may be to
C. Now to hold that C is guilty of no crime would be a -grave miscarriage
of justice, for the moneys, chattels, goods etc. could not be recovered and
very probably B would not be in a position to indemnify A, so logically
there is a total loss of all the trust property. It was clearly not the intention of the legislature to vest such power in a trustee to promote trickery
and fraud.
But strange as it nay seem the wise Solons in our legislative halls
neglected to state in express words in their statute what the specific crime
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of one would be who receives embezzled goods in a case like this. But
what they havw failed to state in express words, they have undoubtedly
cxpressed by tl'e general wording of the following statute, Sect;on 120
Act March 31, 1860.
"If any person sh-ill receive any money, chattel, or valuable security
which shall have been so fraudulently disposed of as to render the party
k' ;posing thereof guilty of a misdemeanor, knowing the-same to have been
s(, fram'lulently disposed, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be
-inc.-ted and convicted thereof whether the party guilty of the principal
misd -meanor shaii or shall not have been previously convicted."
Now the question is what shall be the correct interpretation of the
above section of the act of March 31st, 1860. Let us look first at the words
"fraudulently disposed.'-' FrauC'ilently means in a fraudulent manner.
Fraud is deception deliberately practiced with a view to gaining an unlawful or unfair advantage. By disposal is meant the transference of anything
into new hands. The next point is what is the position of a trustee. A
trustee has a dual capacity, his duties and liabilities as a trustee are separate
and distinct from his duties and liabilities as a private citizen. Although
the two are united in one, yet the distinction is clear cut and defined. They
are as of two different personages.
Now Thomas as trustee undoubtedly "fraudulehtly disposed" of the
money for he deliberately practiced deception with a view to gaining an
unlawful or unfair advantage by transference of the money to Thomas as
a private individual. The statute of embezzlement expressly states that he
who is guilty of embezzlement is guilty of a misdemeanor. We have now
shown Thomas guilty of a misdemeanor and of a fraudulent disposal of
money. Bearing these points in mind let us now construe the statute rc:re1
senting Thomas by B and Adams by C.
Section 120 act of March 31st, 1860:
"If any person (C) shall receive any money, chattel or valuable .erurity which shall have been so fraudulently disposed of as to render the part'
disposing thereof (B) guilty of a misdemeanor, (C) knowing th: same to
have been so fraudulently disposed he (C) shall be guilty of a ii'deneanoand may be indicted and convicted thereof whether the party quilty of the
principal misdemeanor shall or shall not have been prevumsiy conicted."
The facts of the case unquestionably favor this construction.
The jury therefore having convicted the defendant of the misdemeanor
the motion in arrest of judgment is denied.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The crime defined in the l13th section of'the act of March 31st, 1860 is,
the conversion to his own use or that of another by a trustee, of the property which he holds in trust, with intent to defraud, or the disposal or
destruction of the property, with like intent. When one thus appropriates
the property of another, with intent to defraud,he fraudulently disposes of
it. This fraudulent disposition is a misdemeanor. It follows tha.., under
the 120th -section of the same act one who receives the goods in the act of
disposal, is guilty of a misdemeanor. We do not understand the Qection t3
require that there shall have been a completed fraudulent disposit:on, before
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the act of receiving the property vhich is cr-minalized by it. The act of
receiving the property may be a part of the act of disposing of it. The
trustee illegitimately delivers the property to X with an intent to defraud
the cestui que trust. The act of X in receiving it, is a misdemeanor by the
120th section.
Judgment affirmed.

GEORGE CARTER vs. ALFRED TOWNSEND.
Assumpsit, Assignment of Bond without Recourse. Effect of
Fraud by Agent.
SiATEMENT OF FAufS.
Townsend owning a bond executed by Stapleton for $1000, left it with
his agent for collection. It was collected by the agent, who however, concealed this fact from Townsend. On the contrary, he represented to Townsend that the bond was unpaid but that Carter would give him the money
for it if Townsend would assign it. Townsend assigned, writing on the
back of the bond, "In no case am I to be liable should Stapleton not pay
this bond." When Carter sought payment from Stapleton he learned of
the prior payment and of Stapleton's refusal to pay a second time. Townsend's agent embezzled the money he had obtained from Stapleton. This is
assumpsit by Carter to recover the money paid.by him.
JENKINS

for plaintiff.

The principal cannot retain the fruits of the crime and repudiate the
fraud of his agent, Hughes vs. First National Bank, 110 Pa. 428.
DAY for defendant.
The plaintiff took the bond subject to every risk, hence the defendant
is not liable. Chomley vs. Dulles, 8 N. & S. 353.
COHEN, J.-In this case there is an indorsement without recourse
against Townsend in case Stapleton failed to pay the bond on actount of
his insolvency or on account of some set-off but Townsend nevertheless
warranted the existence of the obligation. The agent of Townsend acting
for him (Townsend) could not assign that which practically did not exist
as the bond had been paid to his agent while in the apparent scope of his
authority, and Carter an innocent party cannot be made to suffer by the
fraud of Townsend's agent.
It is a general principle of law that where two innocent parties must
suffer for the fraudulent act of an agent the party who enabled the agent to
act ought to suffer the consequences of the act and in this case Townsend
certainly enabled his agent to commit the fraud by allowing him to act as
his authorized agent.
In 110 Pa. 432 it was held "the concealment of any fact by an agent
becores the concealment of the principal and a principal cannot repudiate
the fraud of his agent." The agent undoubtedly -concealed the fact that the
bond had been paid and the concealment threw Carter off his guard as
there were no circumstances presented to arouse one's suspicion or to
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alarm a prudent man. This doctrine is also adhered to in Jones vs.
National Bld'g Asso. 94 Pa. 215.
Wharton on Contracts Section 268 says "An agent's statement during
a negotiation binds a principal as much as his own statement. Such is
primary evidence which it is not necessary to call the agent to verify. Nor
is it necessary that the representations be specifically authorized by the
principal. They may have been contrary to his direction yet he will be
bound by them if they were made within the apparent range of authority
with which the agent was entrusted." Cases holding similarly are 2 Barr
105 and 11 Norris 424.
In Porter vs. Bright 82 Pa. 441, the Court held: "There is no doubt
every vendor of a bond or other instrument in writing warrants impliedly
his title in the same manner as the vendor of any personal chattel does."
The defense base their case first on an extract from Vol. 5 Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure page 790 which says "In case of a bond or
coupon there is an implied warranty by the vendor that it is a genuine
instrument and binds the vendor, but otherwise when all the facts connected
with" the execution and delivery are disclosed and vendee agrees to take it
at his own risk." In this case all the facts were not disclosed for the agent
concealed the fact that the bond had been previously paid. Another citation
from the same authority page 792 'note) is relied upon; "An agreement that
the assignor shall not be responsible at the time of the assignment, between
the assignor and assignee relieves him from liability even to subsequent assignee without notice, the assignment being in general terms."
This is very true but does not relieve the assignor from liability for fraud
practiced by his agent.
In 126 Pa. 500 the court held "the purchaser of a non-negotiable instrument such as a mortgage is bound to make inquiry of the maker c.f the
mortgage before purchasing and is chargeable with notice of any defense
by way of payment or growing out of the equities of the parties to the
instrument which inquiry would have brought to his notice," but here the
bond was executed by Stapleton and sold by the agent of Townsend who
owned the bond. This suit is not against Stapleton nor is he brought into
the litigation.
Since Townsend is liable for the acts of his agent Carter can recover
the amount paid for the bond with interest.

Judgment for plaintiff.
COURT.
OPINION OF SUPjER±._
When A assigns to B a bond, mortgage or other security he impliedly
warrants'that the security is'legally enforceable. Lhat warranty is broken,
if the bond is a forgery, or if it cannot be collected because it has already
been discharged by payment. Koch v. Hinkle, 35 Super 421.
If the warranty is broken, B may, as damages, recover the money that
he has paid in reliance upon it.
Townsend in consequence of false representations of his agent assigned
the bond to Carter, and put it in the agent's hands in order that he might
deliver .it to Carter, and obtain the money from him. So far as appears,
Carter-receiving the bond, paid the money, and the agent paid it to Townsend. "Why then should Townsend not pay it back to Carter?
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An act of the agent had unknown to Townsend, made the bon. - -'iollectible.. But Townsend's warranty was not simply that he did not 'maw
any fact Mhat would make the bond uncollectible, but that it should 1e in
Law collectible. It was not such. ,,,e warranty was broken.
The fact that the agent had embezzled the money paid by the obligor
can surely not justify Townsend's getthig an equal amount of money from
Carter, and retaining.it.
But parties may qualify their implied contracts as they choose. In
assigning the bond, Townsend has stipulated that "In no case am I to be
liable, should Stapleton not pay this bond." No evidence was submitted,
tending to qualify the signification of those words. No deceit was practiced .by Townsend, whereby Carter was led to accept the assignment with
these words in it. They are very explicit and comprehensive. Stapleton
has not paid the bond. His reason is that he is not legally compellable, nor
morally obliged, to pay it. "In no case" reads the stipulation, "am I to be
liabk 2' etc. We cannot allow Carter to recover without ignoring these
words.
Judgment reversed.

STOKES vs. SAUNDERS ET. AL.
Landlord and Tenant-Eviction-Breach of Landlord's Covenant to
Repair.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Stokes let a dwelling house to Pope for $300 per year. The written
lease mentioned that Stokes "covenanted to keep in repairs the heating'
apparatus." Saunders et al. executed a supplemental paper wherein they
agreed to make up any defaults of Pope within one month. The heatia g
apparatus became out of order and it Was impossible to use it. The
weather was very cold. Stokes not repairing within four weeks aft.er
notice, Pope left the premises owing $150 rent $75 of which was due Oct. 1
and $75 Jan. 1. Failure to repair occurred in February. Th'; is an a.tin
for the rent.
BUTLER for the plaintiff.
CARL for the defendant.
CASE, J.-There can be no doubt in this case that Stokes is entitled. to
recover the. $15.1 due for rent prior to the time that the heating apparatus
went cut of order. The case of Kessler v. McConnechy, 1 Rawle 435 is
directly in. point. In that case it was held "that eviction of the tenant by
the hmdlord has no operation on rent already due, it only suspends the
rent of the month, quarter, or other portion of time running at the time of
eviction." The fact relied upon by the learned counsel for the defense that
lessor by breaking his covenant constructively evicted Pope certainly has
no application to rent due before constructive eviction, occurred. There
being no doubt that Stokes could have recovered $1,0 from Pope the only
remaining question in this case is, could he recover from Sauders et al. who
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ececlited the supplemental paper? The stand taken by the counsel for the
plaintiff that the only way to decide this question is to determine whether
Saunders et al. acted as sureties or guarantors is a correct one.
A surety assumes to perform the contract of the principal if he should
not, while a guarantor undertakes that the principal is able to perform A
case parallel to this is found in 12 Phila. 53 cited by counsel for plaintiff in
which it was held "that an agreement to pay in case of default in payment
by the principal was a contract of suretyship and not of guaranty. Saunders
et al. were sureties of Pope and assumed his part of the contract. Pope
being limle for $1i o rent his sureties are liable for that amount. Judgment
for plaintiff for $150.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Stokes, the lessor, covenanted to keep the heating apparatus in repair.
If he did not do so, Pope could have sued him on the covenant and obtained d~amages. Or, retaining possession, Pope could abate the rent, by the
amount of the damages. rhis is a usual method; Trickett, Landlord and
Tenant, 82. There is little doubt that Pope could himself have caused the
Landlord and
repair to be made, and set off the cost against the rent.
Tenant, 86, and if the cost would not exceed the rent, this 'method wmtd
be wholly feasible.
The mere breach by a landlord of a covenant, is not equivalent to an
eviction. It does not justify the tenant'sa bandonment of the premises, and
refusal to pay any rent. 24 Cyc. 1131. Nor can we concede, upon the
facts disclosed in the case, that Pope was entitled, on Stokes' failure to
renew the apparatus, to desert-the premises.. But see Bitner v. Bangert,
35 Super. 448, %%hereover the dissent of Rice P. P. the court decided otherMhy did.he not repair himself? Would the cost of the repair exwise.
ceed the rentf We are not informed. If the cost-would exceed the rent,
could Pope not have recovered the excess from Stokes? That he could
not ,is not apparent.
The learned court below has.treated the case as if the only question
was, whether Pope suffered an eviction. The failure to repair occurred in
February, and Pope probably left not later than.'March; but not before
February, No eviction then had occurred on Oct. 1st, when $75 of the rent
claimed, became due, nor on January 1st, when the other $75 sued for became due. Hence, concludes the learned court, the entire rent sued for $153
may be recovered. But, whether the non-repair of the heating appara us,
followed by an abandonment of the premises, was an eviction or not, the
promise to repair was a covenant, for the breach of which Pope would be
entitled to such damages as it caused him; and he had a right to set off
these damages against the rent; without respect to the period when that
rent accrued.
Ordinarily, when a tenant abandons the premises in consequence of the
premises being untenantable, he is content with the escape from the rent,
butthereare supposable cases in which the damages suffered by him will exceed the rent, and in such cases there is no apparent reason for refusing to
him the right, by an action, to recover the excess of the damages above the
rent.
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Saunders and the other defendant agreed to make up any defaults. of
Pope within one month. The learned court below as correctly ,concluled
that they thus became sureties; that is, that on the lapse of a month from
any default they became bound to make it up. Their liability did not depend on suit of Pope, or other conditions.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

. HOLTER vs. TAMKER.

Money Paid under mistake of Fact. Right to Recover It.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Holter and Tamker had been dealiug as merchants with each other for
somemonths. Holter cast up an account of their dealings, whereby he found
that he was in debt to Tamker to the amount of $473. He executed a
check for this amount upon Which Tamker received the money. Holter
later discovered that he had made a mistake of $100 in addition. He sues,
three years after Tamker received the money, for the $100. Tamker had
no knowledge of the mistake until two and a half years after payment,
when Holter demanded a return of the money.
fAuCH for plaintiff.

IICCL1NTOCK for defendant.

KING, J.-It is admitted- in this case on all hands that the over payment of $100 by Holter was occasioned by no deceptton on the part of
Tamker,-that the payment was voluntarily made by the one, and was received by the other, through a bona fide mistake of fact. This element bars
the recovery of the plaintiff.
The law presumes that the debtor knows the cond'tion of his accounts
and the extent of his liabilities. Any negligent and careless action on his
part resulting in such over-payment, precludes him from setting up any
claim for repayment. He is presumed to have a more intimate knowledge
of the status of his own affairs than an executor or administrator of the
estate of the decedent.
Yet as between debtor and creditor, and executor and distributee n
distinction is drawn in Penna. as regards over-payment. In a recent case,
Bomgartner vs. Blatt, 35 Superior Court 361, it is held: "Where an executor voluntarily, but by mistake, makes an over-payment to a distributee,
he cannot recover the excess paid, if it appears that the mistake did not
arise from any -statement or representation of the distributee or from any
artifice on his part, and that there was no promise or agreement on the part
of the distributee to repay.'
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In Hinkle vs. Eichelberger, 2 Pa. 483, Gibson, C. J. says :--"Tho the
action for money had and received is a liberal one, and lies, it is said,
wherever a party has received money which in natural justice he is bound
to refund, it has never been extended to money received with:ct unfair
practice or deceit, tho the receivei could not have recovered it by law."
On the same point, the Court in Natcher vs. Natcher, 47 Pa. 496,
declared itself as follows :---A moment's reflection will induce the inquiry,
how can money voluntarily paid be recovered back? Upon what can the
implied promise to repay be rested, against a free and voluntary parting
with the money, without any reservation that it is to be returned? The
latter prechides the former. The act overthrows all presumptions, inconsistent with it, and hence the rule that money voluntarily, paid, that is, paid
without fraud or constraint, can never be recovered back."
We hold the rule to be in Penna.-"mthat where over-payment is voluntarily made, and the defendant shows that such excess was received without knowledge of it as such, and there was no promise to repay alJeged and
proved by the plaintiff, there can be no recovery.
Judgment entered accordingly for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
We are unable to concur in the decision of the learned court of common pleas. Holter made a mistake in addition, wereby he found that his
credits were so much; he correctly found that his debits were greater by
$473. His credits were in fact $100 greater than he found them to be. In
consequence of this mistake, he paid Tamker $100 more than he owed. He
did not intend to give $100 to Tamker. If he had, a subsequent repentance
would not avail him. He intended to pay what the accounts showed that
he owed. He was mistaken as to their showing a debt of $473. They in
fact revealed a debt of only $373. Can money thus paid in consequence of
a mistake of fact, be recovered? Surely it ought to be recoverable. It
would strike the ordinary conscience as iniquitous to retain money coming to one under the influence of such a mistake. There are sufflclin.
precedents for the recovery. Cf. Reed v. Horn, 143 Pa. 323, Th .mas v.
Brady 10 Pa. 164; Meredith v. Haines, 14 W. N. C. 364; 'Girard Trust Co.
v. Harrington, 23 Super. 615; Dotterer v. Scott, 29 Super. 553; McKibben
v. Doyle. 173 Pa. 579, and a jurisprudence that allowed one to retain money
paid to him under a mistake of fact, which, without injury to himself he
could repay, would fall below the requirements of civilization.
It is not necessary to deny that the learned court below found authorities for the conclusion at which he arrived. The student of the adjudica,
tions quickly becomes aware of insoluable antinomies in them, and there are
cases which virtually lay down the principle that if money is freely paid to
B, who receives it without fraud, he will be allowed to retain it even wi+h
fraud. We cannot "assent to them..
Judgment reversed wi:2, v. f. d. t.
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COIIONWEALTH vs. JONES.
Suikde-Azeessory Before the Fact
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gpoi'ER for the commonwealth,
H-ss, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE %.OTRT.
KINARD, .J;---The deceased, Mary Smith, having expressed to the
defendant, Jones, her desire to commit suicide, requested him to procure
the.poison f0f her, which he did. She took the poison and died from the
effects thereof. Jones, having thus aided and abetted in the .commissi6n
of the suicide, is now indicted in this court as accessory beforp the fact to
the murder, to which he demurs.
By his demurrer, the defendant acknowledges the truth of the facts, in
the accusation, but denies that these facts constitute the crime with which
he is charged, namely, accessory before the fact to a felony. Thus it
becomes necessary to know in the first place, what constitutes an accessory
before the fact; and in the second place, whether this case meets those requirements. According to Trickett on Crimiial.iLaw, • Vol. II, page 757,
"An accessory before the fact (in Penna.) is one who, though absent at the
commission of the felony, procures, counsels, or commands another to
commit said felony, subsequently perpetrated in consequence of such procuring, counseling or commanding." From this we find that, in order that
there tnhy be anr actessory before the fact, there must be a felony, which
felony must have been committed; and this brings us to the further question whether suicide, the act committed in this case, is a felony in Pennsylvania.
In England at one time, suicide was cohsidered a felony and was
punished by a'nignominious btrial in the public highway without christian
rites and the forfeiture 6f the estate of the suicide to the Crown.
Kerr on Law of Homicide, page 60 and 61,
However, the law of England has since undergone marked changes and
in 1862, Pollock, C. B. in Regina v. Burgess, L. & C. Crown Cases 258, held
that an attempt tc commit suicide is not an attempt to commit murder, tH.s
necessarily deciding that the act, if committed, was no longer murder in
that :country.
In Pennsylvania suicide has never been punished and -our Constitution
of 1790, as finally readopted in 1874, provides that the estate of such persons
0, shall destroy their own lives shall descend and vest as in cases of natural
death, thus expressly abolishing the former punishment therefor, and since
there can be no crime without a punishment, suicide is no crime and therefore no felony, and it has been so. held in Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Pa.
Dist. Reports !44.
We are therefore bound to conclude that, since there can be no crime
of accessory before the fact without'the commission.of a felony, and sui-
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cide not being ;_ felony in Penna., the facts in this case do not constfute
the crime charged and the defendant stands indicted for an offence. of
which he can not be convicted under this indictment.
It is, however, contended by' the learned attorney for the Commonat this case is provided for by Sec. 44 of the Act of March 3
1860, P. & L. Dig. 1099, which says that "If any person shall become Wn
accessory before the fact to any felony, whether the same be a felony "at
Common Law or by virtue of any act of assembly now in force or hereafter to be in force, such person may be indicted, tried, convicted ardpmiished in all respects as if he were a principal felon," on the'ground that the
common law referred to by the statute is the old commori law from whi:-:.
the Pennsylvania common law has been adopted- and under which sticide
was a felony. This we are unable to concede. Only such of the old common law as was adapted to our conditions and requirements has been
adopted in this country and we are not warranted by affy authority, so far
as we have been able to find, to say that the legislators had any commo I
law in mind except that which has been adopted in this country under
which suicide is not held to be a crime and the statute can therefore not
apply. The ifitention of the legislators, as appears from the statute, was
to make the punishment of the accessory possible irrespective of the punishment of the principal since by our common h-iw the accessories could only
be punished after the conviction of the principal felon.
It is further contended, on the part of the commonwealth that th's
defendant is guilty of murder and should be convicted, and Kerr's Law of
Homicide 52 (1891), Comm. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 and Reg. v Alison,
8 Car. & P. 418 are cited to support the contention. As to whether or not
the defendant would be guilty under an indictment for the murder of the
deceased, we db no' feel called upon at this time to decide, but we can not
submit to such conviction under this indictment, even though guilty, as is
contended.
In thc indictment before us, the defendant is charged with being in
accessory before the fact to a suicide which cannot be and is not a crime in
Pennsylvania and we are unable to concede that under such indictnen'. the
facts not constituting the crime charged, the defendant can be convicted of
any other crime.
Demurrer sustained and indictment quashed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The 44th section of the act of t860 enacts that if any person shall
become an accessory before the fact to any felony, at common law or by
virtue of any act of assembly now in force or hereafter to be in force, such
person may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if
he were a principal felon.'
This section operates only where any person is an accessory, But
there can be no accessory at common law, unless there is a different principal felon. There are but two persons brought into view by this indictment, Mary Smith and the defendant Jones. Did Mary Smith commit a
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felony? She hag killed herself. But that act is not a felony. Aiding and
abetting her in the commission of suicide are not aiding and abetting her to
and in the commission of a felony.
But the indictment alleges that, Mary Smith expressing the desire and
intention to kill herself, by means of a poison, and requesting Jones to
procuie the poison for her, in order that she might poison herself, Jones
procured for hei the poison. It was accordingly taken by Mary Smith, and
she died. Does this act of Jones make him the killer of Mary Smith? If
so, he is not an accessory but the principal in that killing. A may persuade
B, an innocent child, to set poison for C, of which C. partaking, he dies.
The child is not a principal in the poisoning, but A is. So, we imagine, A
may induce, or aid- B to do an act which, conceived as B's act, is innocent,
in the sense that'the law does not penalize it, but which may be regarded
also as A's act, and which, thus regarded, is criminal.
That, -were Mary Smith's act her felony, the aiding in the doing of it
would have been an accessoryship, cannot be doubted. ilqor can it properly
be doubted, we think, that, she being dispunishable, and in that sense innocent, the same act that, on Jones' part would have been accessory, becomes
principal. He might have been indicted for the malicious killing of Mary
Smith, her act being imputable to him. See discussion in 9 Forum, p. 222,
and Barnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208; 66 L. R. A. 304.
The question then that remains, is, whether the murder by Jones of
Mary Smith is sufficiently averred in the indictment. She is alleged in it
to have. asked his aid to kill herself and he to have given it. It was not
strictly correct to describe these acts as constituting an accessoryship. But,
the facts constituting a murder all being stated in the indictment, the mere
fact that they are subsumed under an improper class, or name ought not to
be material, if the law treats aits of that class, precisely as it would treat
acts of the other class. If Jones had in fact been an accessory, it is directed by the 44th section, that he might be charged to have been a-principal. Proof of the accessoryship would be proof of the principalship.
Jones was in fact a principal. He is in the indictment, alleged' to. have
been. a principal, for the facts which make him such are there stated.
That these facts are also classified as an accessoryship, ought not to vitiate
the indictment after verdict. If they were an accessoryship, they would
be punishable prcisely as they will be, if treated as a principalship. Cf.
Com. v. Bradley, 16 Super. 561.
It is however a formal defect of the indictment, and, as such demurrable.
Judgment affirmed.

